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ABSTRACT 
 
Companies are constantly facing risks, including financial constraints, which may contribute to 
companies being unable to trade in the manner desired. Unfortunately, companies that find 
themselves in this predicament have, in reality, been without a remedy from as early as statutory 
provisions regulating company law were promulgated in 1926. Judicial management, as a 
remedy, is notorious for being an outright failure, but the current Companies Act 71 of 2008 
introduced the remedy of business rescue for financially distressed companies. The scrutiny 
and spotlight on the new remedy turns on whether it can be truly accessible for the companies 
in question and what significant changes it has made to favour financially distressed companies. 
This mini dissertation will aim to discuss whether the remedy of business rescue has been a 
success or failure. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In any given environment, the sustaining of a particular region can be successful, or at least 
manageable, through the growth of its economy. In recent times, and becoming more prevalent 
in the twentieth century, is the significant role played by business entities in the stimulation of 
the economy. Section 22 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 19961 provides 
that ‘everyone has the right to pursue the trade or occupation or profession of his or her choice’, 
and such a right is afforded to juristic entities as well.2 A consequence of business ventures is 
the looming probabilities of failure in the risks that have been taken, and one can only wonder 
if the supreme law3 has made any provisions to resuscitate a business that has suffered 
economically in its business ventures. 
II.  COMPANIES ACT 46 OF 1926  
In a scenario where a company has incurred liabilities that exceed the assets of the company, 
it is inevitable that the company will face several obstacles when trading, with the possibility 
of a flow of income being stifled, thereby affecting the overall trade and operation of the 
company. The controversy arises when a company is not insolvent but foresees the possibility 
of an inability to pay its debts when they become due and enforceable, although such a 
company remains a participant in the economic spectrum. It is my submission that the issue 
that arises is whether such a company should be pronounced as insolvent, and therefore proceed 
with liquidation. 
Fortunately, there were inroads that came to facilitate companies experiencing financial 
difficulties, with the intention to veer away from the ‘fatal’ reality of insolvency. The South 
African legal system was one of the first countries to identify this need and make provisions 
for it through the birth of judicial management.4 The remedy of judicial management provided 
                                                          
1 This is the highest law of the Republic of South Africa. 
2 Section 8 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, provides that, ‘[t]he Bill of Rights applies 
to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state’. Section 8 (2) further states 
that ‘[a] provision of the Bill of rights binds a natural or a juristic person, if, and to the extent that it is applicable, 
taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right’. 
3 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
4 EP Joubert ‘“Reasonable possibility” versus “reasonable prospect”: Did business rescue succeed in creating a 
better test than judicial management?’ (2013) 76 THRHR at 550; Anneli Loubser ‘Business rescue in South Africa: 
A procedure in search of a home’ 2007 XL CILSA at 153. 
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that an application could be made for an ailing company to be placed under judicial 
management if there was a reasonable probability that the company would be able to pay off 
all its debts when they become due and enforceable, and yield a successful concern.5 
 The operation of judicial management was intended that the business of a company 
would be placed in the hands of the judicial manager,6 who would then come up with a 
management plan to be accepted by creditors that stipulates how the company purports to pay 
off the creditors’ debts in full. This management plan is the compass of the company for the 
duration that the business is under judicial management- it cannot be interfered with by the 
directors or shareholders at any time, even if they do not approve of the judicial management 
style. 
The reality of judicial management, however, was anything but a positive response, or 
a response at all, to an urgent SOS call for financially constrained companies. Writers7 have 
criticised judicial management for being extremely cumbersome and ineffective8 in its 
operation, first, the burden of proof has been to show a ‘reasonable probability’ that the 
business will stay afloat if and after it has been placed under judicial management. The court 
in Noordkaap Bpk v Schreuder (Noordkaap) 9 held that the meaning of the words ‘probable’ 
and ‘possible’ are material to the application;10 the latter making reference to one being less 
sure to happen whilst the former required a level of certainty that the business would turn 
around and return a company to its solvent status. 
It becomes evident that a business cannot actually show that it is certain that judicial 
management will keep it afloat, and thus, the onus is not discharged; the court will then be 
expected to reject the application.11 If an application for judicial management is dismissed, the 
court also indirectly pronounces that such a business is insolvent, which inevitably leads to the 
liquidation and winding-up of the company.12 The controversy that is created by this 
requirement in practical situations raises several eyebrows as to why the legislature would 
create a provision that is neither attainable nor expedient and cost effective for an ailing 
                                                          
5 Section 195 of the Companies Act 46 of 1926. 
6 A judicial manager is an external person who possesses the skills to manage a business in an effective manner. 
7 These writers include EP Joubert, Richard Bradstreet and Anneli Loubser. 
8  Joubert op cit note 4; Anneli Loubser ‘Business rescue in South Africa: a procedure in search of a home’ 2007 
XL CILSA at 153. 
9  Noordkaap Bpk v Schreuder 1974 (3) SA 102 (A). 
10  Ibid para 110. 
11 Loubser op cit note 8 at 155; Joubert op cit note 4; and Richard Bradstreet ‘The new business rescue: Will 
creditors sink or swim?’(2011) 128 SALJ at 354.  
12  Ibid. 
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company. It is thus my submission that the conduct of the legislature is both questionable and 
disappointing if the exercise of such a remedy would lead to the liquidation of the company, 
because it is the very same predicament that the company was desperately seeking to avoid in 
making the aforementioned application. 
Secondly, a company had to show that, once placed under judicial management, the 
company would trade and be able to discharge all of its obligations towards its creditors in full. 
This is yet another unrealistic obstacle placed before a company because an ailing company 
would seek to discharge and pay off as many debts as possible, and it is my submission that 
agreements such as set-off and compromise with the creditors would have weighed in the 
favour of the business because it would be placed under judicial management for a shorter 
interval and also get an opportunity to yield a better return in profits to inject the much needed 
finances to the would-be solvent business. 
Richard Bradstreet13 suggested that the remedy of judicial management was heavily 
creditor-oriented because it focused on the full payment of the creditors’ debts more than it did 
in trying to keep the company in engagement in the economic arena.14 Additionally, persons 
who were appointed judicial managers were mostly liquidators, thus meaning that a creditor-
oriented management plan would inevitably lead to liquidation, where creditors could make 
full claim of the debt due to him or her.15 The operation of a remedy in such a manner shows 
that there is no regard given to the company but that creditors are the focal point, even though 
they already have a remedy in winding-up a company. 
Lastly, and in contradictory fashion, an order of placing a company under judicial 
management can only be granted if the company is able to show that the company will be a 
‘successful concern’. The meaning of this phrase begs the question, ‘will the company be able 
to carry on business as usual, make a profit and discharge its liabilities?’, and it is quite a 
difficult question to answer because the remedy requires too much of an ailing company. A 
business seeking judicial management must show that it will be able to pay off its debts, paying 
all of them in full and still operate to make a profit. The remedy seems to overlook, in my view, 
the fact that a business seeking judicial management already has a supple amount of obligations 
on its plate and further burdens would only push it closer to insolvency. A failure to meet this 
                                                          
13 Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 352-83. 
14  Ibid at 354. 
15  Ibid. 
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requirement is conclusive evidence that the company can no longer operate in the economic 
arena, leading to the insolvency of the company and being inevitably wound-up. 
 
III. COMPANIES ACT 61 OF 1973  
The remedy of judicial management has been the subject of much criticism than it has been 
used to actually keep any businesses afloat, thus allowing them to retrieve a solvent status. The 
legislature was presented with an opportunity to fix the financial and juristic losses created by 
the remedy that perpetuated with its inefficiency for 47 years, nearly five decades of outright 
failure to aid financially pressured companies, through the drafting of the new Companies Act 
that would repeal the 1926 Act. When the Companies Act 61 of 1973 was promulgated, the 
legislature surprisingly failed to take into cognisance any of the criticisms and 
recommendations made about judicial management; the remedy was directly imported into the 
new Act.16 
Unsurprisingly, the remedy under the 1973 Act continued to be ineffective because of 
the onerous burden created, whereby more and more companies seeking to exercise the remedy 
still failed to discharge the obligation and inevitably faced liquidation. Bradstreet suggests that, 
by the year 1980, few companies still used judicial management;17 and it is clear therefore, that 
the remedy automatically led to liquidation, and the decrease in its use meant that companies 
preferred liquidation instead as a first option when faced with financial difficulties. This is 
conclusive proof that the remedy has been promulgated, more than once, in futility. 
Furthermore, by the year 1980, less than twenty per cent of the companies that were 
successfully placed on judicial management avoided liquidation,18 meaning that a majority of 
helpless companies were liquidated nonetheless. 
IV. COMPANIES ACT 71OF 2008  
The termination of a company’s juristic status through judicial management from as early as 
1926 clearly and devastatingly, for South African company law jurisprudence, fell on deaf 
ears,19 the legislature only started making changes to the remedy once it became evident 
through international jurisdictions that rescue platforms are and should be available and 
                                                          
16 Joubert op cit note 4 at 552. 
17 Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 353. 
18  Ibid. 
19 Joubert op cit note 4 at 553. 
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accessible to companies because of the crucial impact and contribution of the companies.20 
Additionally, rescue remedies also have the advantage of resolving the future prospects and 
trajectory of a company in a swift manner.21 
The main criticisms that were advanced against judicial management were offered with 
recommendations that seek to genuinely afford ailing companies a second chance at solvency, 
and one such suggestion was amending the duty on the applicant to show that there is a 
‘reasonable probability’ to a ‘reasonable possibility’.22 The current Companies Act23 creates a 
new remedy that is located in Chapter 6, and section 129 (1) and section 131 (4) (a) contemplate 
that a company that is financially distressed can be placed under business rescue where the 
applicant can show that, in placing the business under rescue, there are reasonable prospects of 
recovery24 of the business or that if the business is placed under business rescue, it will yield a 
better return for creditors than in a circumstance where the business is placed in liquidation.25 
The creation of the business rescue as a remedy was largely influenced by international 
jurisdictions26 because South African company law urgently required a development that 
cemented the notion that a business fares more favourably and carries a grand value when it is 
a going concern rather than when it is undergoing liquidation.27 This development is consistent 
with section 7 (k) of the 2008 Companies Act, which clearly states that the purpose of statute 
is to ‘provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies, in a 
manner that balances the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders’. 
Business rescue has been favoured more by the courts because the standard imposed on 
the applicant is less onerous, as ‘something less is required’, in comparison to the burdensome 
standard imposed by judicial management, which ultimately rendered the remedy as 
inoperative from the outset.28 In discharging this onus, the applicant must prove the existence 
                                                          
20 Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 353; Loubser op cit note 8 at 158. 
21 M Pretorius & W Rosslyn-Smith ‘Expectations of a business rescue plan: international directives for Chapter 6 
implementation’ (2014) 18 South African Business Review, 109-39. 
22 Joubert op cit note 4 at 554. 
23  Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
24 The standard of proof for business rescue is captivated in the phrase ‘reasonable prospects’, and it can be 
compared to judicial management’s ‘reasonable probability’. 
25 Section 128 (b) (iii) of Act 71 of 2008. 
26 Such as Australia, Canada, the U.S and the U.K. 
27 Pretorius & Rosslyn-Smith op cit note 21 at 109; Loubser op cit note 8 at 152 and 158. 
28 Southern Palace Investments v Midnight Storm Investments; Koen v Wedgewood Village & Country Estate ;  
Oakdene Square Properties v Farm Bothasfontein;  Swart v Beagles Run Investments; Propspec Investments v 
Pacific Coast Investments  and Nedbank v Bestvest. 
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of two elements, that is, the company is financially distressed29 and there appears30 to be a 
reasonable prospect of rescuing the company.31 With regards to the former, section 128 defines 
‘financially distressed’ as an appearance of a reasonable unlikelihood that a company will be 
capable of making payments for all of its debts as they become due and enforceable in the next 
six months32 whilst the latter concept is not defined in the Act, for which such interpretation 
has been left fully to the courts.33 
In one of the earliest applications for business rescue, the court in Southern Palace 
Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd (Southern Palace),34 held that 
the remedy is for an ailing business that can be recovered through the ordinary trade of the 
business under the supervision of a business rescue practitioner.35 In subsequent applications 
made, the courts have been reluctant to place a company under business rescue which had 
ceased trading long before it was in the financially distressed position.36 In the case of Lidino 
Trading 580 CC v Cross Point Trading (Pty) Ltd; in re: Mabe v Cross Point Trading 215 (Pty) 
Ltd (Lidino),37 the court held that a company that gained profit through the procurement of 
tenders and has not traded in a number of years cannot possibly show a reasonable prospect of 
recovery because there is nothing to recover and there is no guarantee that a sufficient number 
of tender deals could be procured for the period that the business was placed under rescue, and 
thus, the court dismissed the application for lack of merit.38 
Chapter 6 makes provision for business rescue applications to be placed before the 
courts by directors or affected persons. Section 129 contemplates that an application for 
business rescue can be made by the board of the company when a resolution has been passed 
to voluntarily place the company under business rescue. This would be dependent on the 
satisfaction of the abovementioned requirements.39  
                                                          
29 Section 129 (1) (a) of Act 71 of 2008. 
30 The relevance of this wording will be returned to at a later stage for further discussion. 
31 Section 129 (1) (b) of Act 71 of 2008. Shelley Mackay-Davidson & Michael Crystal suggest that financial 
distress is the trigger in ‘Saving graces: liquidation, compromise or business rescue? ’ (2015) 9 Without Prejudice 
at 18. 
32 Section 128 (1) (f) (i) of Act 71 of 2008. 
33 Mackay-Davidson & Crystal op cit note 31 at 19;  Yaniv Kleitman & Courtney Masters ‘Better return for 
creditors- business rescue’ (2013) 8 Without Prejudice at 34. 
34 Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd 2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC). 
35 Ibid para 23. 
36 AG Petzetakis International Holdings v Petzetakis Africa; and Gormley v West City Precinct Properties. 
37 Mabe v Cross Point Trading 215 (Pty) Ltd (2012) ZAFSHC 155. 
38 Ibid para 24. 
39 The procedure that the company must follow is set out in section 129 (2) and subsequent provisions. 
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This section provides a better position for business rescue to be granted because the 
board of directors of a company are the most educated and well-versed about the financial state 
of the company and they can clearly state whether the application is for restoring the business 
into solvency or to yield a better return for creditors before winding up the company.40 Section 
131, however, bestows an affected person41 to make the application to place a company under 
business rescue, and once such an application has been made, notice must be given to other 
affected persons so that they can join in the proceedings42 since their financial interests are 
affected by the discretion exercised by the court. 
The interpretation of Chapter 6 has been tried by several high courts around the country, 
leading to several important landmark judgments that have developed and catapulted South 
African company law jurisprudence. In the first ever recorded case of an application for 
business rescue, the court in Swart v Beagles Run Investments (Swart),43 regarded business 
rescue as a new remedy in South African law keeping with the purpose of the 2008 Companies 
Act, but when it came to the application of the requirements for business rescue, the court 
turned to section 427 of the 1973 Companies Act and dismissed the application on the ground 
that the applicant failed to show that there would be ‘a successful concern’ if business rescue 
is granted.44 
The court in the Swart  judgment has been heavily criticised for the blunder of applying 
a repealed remedy to an application for a new form of relief, particularly the finding in terms 
of a phrase that is foreign to Chapter 6 of the 2008 Companies Act,45 and as a result, the first 
ever proper interpretation of business rescue proceedings was achieved in Southern Palace46 
where it was held that the courts must be cautious of applying a strict standard on applicants 
brought down from the remedy of judicial management when business rescue essentially 
required something less so that companies can be given a breathing space to restore themselves 
back to a state of solvency.47 In showing that there are reasonable prospects of recovery, the 
court introduced several requirements that the applicant must satisfy that show that the 
                                                          
40 Joubert op cit note 4 at 555. 
41 Section 128 (1) (a) defines an affected person to be a shareholder, creditor, a registered trade union representing 
employees of the company and any employees of a company that are not represented by a trade union (or their 
representatives). 
42 Golden Dividend 339 (Pty) ltd v Absa Bank Limited; Cape Point Vineyards v Pinnacle Point Group and 
Kalahari Resources v Arcelormittal. 
43 Swart v Beagles Run Investments2011 (5) SA 422 (GNP). 
44 Ibid para 42. 
45 Joubert op cit note 4 at 555. 
46 Southern Palace supra note 34 para 31. 
47 Ibid para 3. 
 13 
 
proposed rescue plan is not merely speculative.48 Lastly, the court also stated, in passing, that 
where an application has been dismissed because no reasonable prospects have been shown, 
the applicant is not barred from making an application again after taking into account the 
suggested amendments offered by the courts.49 
Gamble J in Nedbank Limited v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd; Essa & another v Bestvest 153 
(Pty) Ltd & others (Bestvest)50 confirmed the findings of Southern Palace, in addition to an 
extensive and thorough explanation of the importance and necessity of business rescue, 
particularly advancing the opinion that a strong and swift deviation from the interpretation and 
application of judicial management for business rescue, so that the remedy is valid and 
operative for businesses.51 In the interpretation of ‘reasonable prospects’, the court went as far 
as making reference to the requirements enunciated in Southern Palace52 The requirements laid 
down in Southern Palace have been criticised for creating hard and fast rules for what may be 
deemed to be a ‘reasonable prospect’, thereby placing a heavier burden on applicants,53 and 
this criticism is valid because in most cases where the requirements were applied, the 
application was dismissed. This created a threat for the remedy altogether as it posed a looming 
possibility that it is no different from judicial management.  
In Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd & others v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) 
Ltd & others (Oakdene),54 the court held that a court must assess the relevant facts and make a 
value judgment that is consistent with the purpose of business rescue rather than formulating a 
checklist approach that leads to the granting of liquidation orders of companies, thereby 
covertly illustrating that the companies were better off having made no attempt to seek 
assistance from the courts.55  
Subsequent case law has shown, however, that courts are moving away from applying 
the requirements and elect to consider the merits of the application.56 In Koen & another v 
                                                          
48 Southern Palace supra note 34 para 24. These are succinctly stated as; the cause of the failure needs to be 
addressed, a remedy for the failure needs to be offered, there is a reasonable prospect that the remedy advanced 
will be sustainable, and the above aspects prove, based on ‘concrete and objective ascertainable details beyond 
speculation’, that the remedy is sustainable.   
49 Southern Palace supra note 34 para 23. 
50 Nedbank Limited v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) SA 497 (WCC). 
51 Ibid paras 18 and 27. 
52 Nedbank v Bestvest supra note 50 para 48. 
53 Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd & others v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd & others 2013 (4) 
SA 539 (SCA) para 28. 
54 Oakdene supra note 53. 
55 Ibid para 21. 
56 AG Petzetakis International Holdings v Petzetakis Africa & others 2012 (5) SA 515 (GSJ); Climate Concrete 
Products CC v Evening Flame Trading & others [Unreported case no 812/2012 (21 June 2012); Firstrand Bank 
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Wedgewood Village & Country Estate & others (Koen),57 the court commented on ‘reasonable 
prospects’, holding that there must be cogent proof that a business will return to a state of 
solvency where business rescue is granted rather than speculative or hopeful prospects.58 
Interestingly, in the case of Gormley v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd & another; 
Anglo Irish Corporation Ltd v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd & another (Gormley),59 
an application for business rescue was made solely for the purpose of pausing an application 
of the liquidation of the company, the applicant failed to show any reasonable prospects of 
success of business rescue.60 The application was accordingly dismissed. 
V. PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY 
In this paper, the business rescue remedy will be analysed as to whether it has made a 
meaningful contribution to the South African economy and providing companies with the 
much-needed relief that judicial management was unable to provide for an alarmingly 
extensive period of 85 years. To facilitate this analysis, the remedy will be observed within the 
relevant legislative background, unpacking the rights to the remedy available to the company 
and affected persons. Additionally, the court’s discretion in granting or refusing an order will 
be commented on through the lens of a few cases decided since its inception. Chapter three 
will take a closer look on the moratorium, international jurisdictions and controversial cases 
involving the moratorium. Lastly, chapter four will deal with the great debate of business 
rescue versus liquidation, each of these remedies will be compared and contrasted to deduce 
whether they can co-exist. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
Ltd v Imperial Crown Trading 143 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (4) SA 266 (KZD); and Madodza v Absa & others [Unreported 
case no 38906/2012 (15 August 2012)].  
57 Koen & another v Wedgewood Village & Country Estate & others2012 (2) SA 378 (WCC). 
58 Ibid para 17. 
59 Gormley v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd & another; Anglo Irish Corporation Ltd v West City Precinct 
Properties (Pty) Ltd & another (2012) ZAWCHC 33. 
60 Ibid paras 12 and 14. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
I. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND 
Prior to 1994, the corporate arena was governed by the common law61 and legislation,62 and to 
a great extent, such regulation was concerned with the economic and juristic status of corporate 
entities, and thus, there was hardly any regard for any issues of fairness in the facilitation of 
companies.63 Since the constitutional advent, the legislature has put in more effort in giving 
effect to the rights enshrined in the Constitution, in addition to creating laws that seek to redress 
historical disadvantages.64 
One right that is particularly relevant in corporate law is the right to ‘choose a trade, 
occupation or profession’,65 which comes with the consequence that such a right ought to be 
exercised freely.66 This right is quite controversial in the private law area, with specific 
reference to contract law67 but is not limited to contractual undertakings in so far as it covers 
the scope of corporate entities. For corporate entities, the right to choose a trade and to trade 
so freely becomes paramount at the infancy of a company; when it is a financial risk, facing 
insolvency, and even in the day-to-day administration and effective management of a company. 
A company that is in a financial crisis needs such a right more than ever to avert the 
termination of its legal status, and it is thus clear that this right requires the enforcement of sui 
generis protection in respect of companies. This cry of desperation and helplessness was 
attended to when the legislature was drafting a new Act to govern corporate entities in light of 
the Constitution,68 and the end product was Chapter 6 of the Companies Act69 which came into 
effect on 1 May 2011. 
                                                          
61 This relates to notions such as, ‘lifting or piercing the corporate veil’, the business judgment rule, duties of 
directors, liability of directors and partnerships. 
62 The Companies Act 46 of 1926, which was repealed by the Companies Act 61 of 1973, and the Close 
Corporations Act 69 of 1984.  
63 The only exceptional circumstance where this factor came into consideration was in relation to the business 
judgment rule. 
64 Such as the facilitation of BEE (‘black economic empowerment’)-owned companies through the platforms of 
the current legislation. 
65 Section 22 of the Constitution. 
66 Ibid. 
67 This right is widely debated on in relation to the common law right to freedom of contract and the cornerstone 
principle of pacta sunt servanda—which gives to the expression that contracts entered freely into must be enforced. 
68 The Constitution op cit note 65. 
69 Act 71 of 2008.  
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Chapter 6 of the 2008 Companies Act focuses largely on the new remedy of business 
rescue; this remedy was intended to save companies from the brink of insolvency, and these 
intentions were purposefully drafted in light of the constitutional values.70 It is my submission 
that the constitutional value of freedom takes preference over equality and human dignity in 
business rescue proceedings because business rescue is seeking to enforce the constitutional 
rights and interests of companies, something that the remedy of judicial management was 
unable to take into the slightest consideration. 
 In this chapter, what will be explored is how the 2008 Companies Act gave effect to 
and extended the constitutional right to freely trade to companies through the creation of the 
business rescue remedy, with precise reference to the procedure for making an application for 
business rescue. Additionally, this chapter will also delve into the interpretations of the courts 
on its discretion regarding the remedy to illustrate the trajectory of the corporate platform 
within the constitutional framework; a novel albeit exciting narrative for South African 
jurisprudence. 
II. THE PROCEDURE CONTEMPLATED IN CHAPTER 6 
As previously stated above, Chapter 6 of the 2008 Companies Act encapsulates the remedy of 
business rescue in skeletal fashion, and it is up to the courts to determine and give direction to 
the remedy, thereby casting light on the future of ailing companies.71 Section 128 introduces 
the remedy by providing a clear and concise definition of the terms to be used throughout the 
chapter such as ‘business rescue’, ‘financially distressed’ and ‘affected person’, whilst section 
129 and section 131 deal specifically with access to the remedy—which is the focal point in 
the following analysis. 
(a) Section 129: Voluntary application by resolution 
Chapter 6 provides for two methods of filing for business rescue, an application can be brought 
before a High Court where the company has passed a resolution that the company is, in fact, 
‘financially distressed’, and it would be in the best interests of the company to commence 
business rescue proceedings.72 An application made in terms of section 129 demonstrates that 
the company, through its directors,73 have taken cognisance that the strategies and plans for the 
                                                          
70 These are: equality, human dignity and freedom. 
71 Loubser op cit note 8 at 153. 
72 Section 129 (1) of Act 71 of 2008. 
73 Alongside the co-operation of the company’s shareholders. 
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company, both implemented with success or failure (as is the risk that comes with running a 
business), have been ineffective and the company would do much better if a restructuring of 
the business74 would be done by an external person.75  
It has been suggested that the voluntary application for business rescue is a step in the 
right direction for an ailing company, because the reasonable prospects of a successful recovery 
are more likely since the directors of the company possess the documentation that clarifies 
financial affairs of the business.76 Furthermore, once a resolution has been taken, it must be 
communicated to all of the affected parties,77 and such communication must contain a 
comprehensive explanation of why business rescue is necessary to ensure the continued trade 
of the company,78 and the method chosen by the company must be one that is sufficient to reach 
all the relevant affected persons so that such persons can have the election of challenging the 
resolution or to abide by it.79 
Once the directors have communicated the notice, section 130 allows the affected 
person to object to the voluntary application for business rescue if the affected person genuinely 
believes that the company is not financially distressed according to the definition provided for 
in the Act,80 that is, there are no reasonable prospects of recovery, or that the voluntary 
application failed to comply with the requirements necessary for the company to be placed 
under business rescue.81  
If an application to set aside the resolution is granted, the affected person still has two 
further rights available to him or her regarding the status of the company, that is, the affected 
person is presented with a platform to make an application for the company to be wound-up in 
terms of section 345 of the 1973 Companies Act, or to place the company under business rescue 
                                                          
74 Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 352; Eric Levenstein ‘Getting clever with business rescue’ (2012) 8 Without 
Prejudice at 30; and Oakdene supra note 53 para 33. 
75 That is, the business rescue practitioner. 
76 Joubert op cit note 4 at 555. This is also supported by the caution given by the court in Absa v Newcity Group; 
Cohen v Newcity Group (2012) ZAGPJHC 144 at para 20, where it was suggested that the court must have solid 
information at its disposal, and not only visionary information. 
77 Cape Point Vineyards v Pinnacle Point Group 2011 (5) SA 600 (WCC) para 12; Harvey E Wainer ‘The 
Insolvency conundrum in the Companies Act’ (2013) 132 SALJ at 512. 
78 Wainer ibid. 
79 Cape Point Vineyards supra note 77 para 13. In this judgment it was held that communication of notice via 
electronic messaging was sufficient; Wainer op cit note 77 at 512. 
80 FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2011) 785. 
81 These include, but are not limited to- giving notice to affected persons, appointing a business rescue practitioner, 
and after the application is granted, the company fails to adopt a business rescue plan. 
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if the affected person can show that the company will yield a better return for creditors than if 
it was faced with liquidation.82 
(b)  Section 130: Opposing a resolution 
It is very obvious, from the notions advanced above, that business rescue is not entirely relating 
to the company but maintains a certain rank of being creditor-oriented,83 so that creditors84 can 
enforce the rights conferred to them by the Constitution, the 2008 Companies Act or any other 
source of law. It has been argued that the application to set aside the resolution adopted does 
not reflect the expeditious encounter for affected persons, and it would be a rather exorbitant 
tariff on them to settle in legal costs just to enforce their rights,85 it is my submission, however, 
that this argument is flawed because it undermines the competence of the courts to comment 
on an application for business rescue that is showing that the company is neither financially 
distressed nor capable of showing reasonable prospects of recovery.86  
Furthermore, an affected person need not approach the court to set aside the resolution 
where the abovementioned factors are not complied with, since the court is likely to order 
liquidation of the company;87 the notice of the adoption of the resolution is sufficient for the 
affected party to be present in court to hear the proceedings and then he or she may decide what 
is the next move for his or her interests. 
In the following cases, an application in terms of section 130 had been made: 
Golden Dividend 339 (Pty) Ltd & another v Absa Bank Limited (Golden Dividend)88 
A loan agreement was entered into between the parties for R8 million, but the appellant had 
ceased payment of the loan in 2012, and by July 2013, R6 million plus interest was still 
outstanding. On 27 August 2013, a resolution was adopted to place the appellant under business 
                                                          
82 Section 128 (1) (b) (iii) of Act 71 of 2008; Oakdene supra note 53 paras 17 and 23; Gormley supra note 59 para 
12; H Stoop ‘When does an application for business rescue proceedings suspend liquidation proceedings?’ 2014 
De Jure at 334; and Levenstein op cit note 74 at 30. 
83Loubser op cit note 8 at 157; Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 364. 
84 Or affected persons. 
85 Lara Khan ‘Business rescue-panacea or poison pill?’ (2010) 3 Siber Ink at 20.  
86 Oakdene supra note 53 para 18. 
87 Oakdene supra note 53; Newcity Group supra note 76; Petzetakis supra note 56; Gormley supra note 59 ; and 
Nedbank supra note 50. 
88 Golden Dividend 339 (Pty) Ltd & another v Absa Bank Limited [2016] ZASCA 78. 
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rescue.89 The respondent served notice on the appellant of the respondent’s application to 
declare the resolution to be unlawful and invalid.90 
In the contentions before the court, the appellant raised a point in limine that notice of 
the opposition application should have been given to other affected persons so that they could 
join in on the respondent’s application because of the direct and substantial interest that the 
affected persons held91, whilst the respondent advanced that notice had been given to affected 
persons but such persons failed to show any interest in the setting aside of the resolution.92 The 
court a quo rejected the defence raised in limine for lack of merit, and granted the section 130 
application, thereby setting aside the resolution and placing the company in final liquidation.93 
On appeal before the SCA, the appellant argued that the court a quo had made an 
incorrect ruling in rejecting the defence in limine since the respondent had failed to give notice 
to the creditors.94 The court held that it was necessary and of paramount importance that the 
other creditors be given notice of the application to oppose the resolution adopted to voluntarily 
place the company under business rescue.95 The court accordingly accepted that the failure to 
give notice was a fatal flaw to the application;96 and this failure impeded the court from hearing 
the opposition application on its own merits, essentially setting aside the order of the court a 
quo.97 
Climax Concrete Products CC v Evening Flame Trading 449 (Pty) Ltd & others98 
This was an urgent application for the setting aside of a resolution in terms of section 130 of 
the 2008 Companies Act, the facts were that the respondent owed the applicant R629 088.27, 
and the respondent had failed to make payments. On 27 February 2012, the respondent filed a 
notice of commencement of rescue proceedings; at the hearing99 the court highlighted that the 
applicant had to show that- 
                                                          
89 The resolution was adopted by 89 per cent of the creditors with voting rights. 
90 Golden Dividend supra note 88 para 2. 
91 Golden Dividend supra note 88 para 5. 
92 Ibid para 6. 
93 Ibid para 8.  
94 It must be borne in mind that these creditors are the ones who adopted the resolution, thus, it was imperative 
that they should have been made aware of any attempts to undo their decision. 
95 Golden Dividend supra note 88 para 10. 
96 Ibid. 
97 This order, therefore, set aside the application of opposition in terms of section 130 and re-instated the adopted 
resolution to place the under business rescue. 
98 Climax Concrete Products CC v Evening Flame Trading 449 (Pty) Ltd & others unreported case no 812/2012 
(21 June 2012). 
99 Of the opposition application by Climax Concrete Products.  
 20 
 
1. It has a prima facie right; 
2. A reasonable apprehension of harm would result in the event that the interim relief is not 
granted; 
3. There was a balance of convenience; and 
4. There was no alternative relief available to the applicant.100 
Regarding the prima facie right, the court accepted that the applicant had established 
its existence because the respondent was indebted to the applicant;101 secondly, the applicant 
argued that the business rescue application was illegitimate because no notice was given to 
interested parties and there was a strong likelihood that the respondent would dissipate its assets 
once placed under business rescue.102 The court accepted that there was a balance struck 
between the interests of the company and those of the affected persons,103 and found there was 
no alternative relief available to the applicant as a creditor, and thus the interdict was granted 
to set the resolution aside.104 
Madodza (Pty) Ltd (in business rescue) v Absa Bank Limited & others (Madodza)105 
The respondents made an application to remove their vehicles from the applicant’s possession 
because the latter failed to appoint a business rescue practitioner after the company had been 
placed under business rescue.106The company had failed to comply with section 129 (3) (b), 
which stated that, 
‘[w]ithin five business days after a company has adopted and filed a resolution, as contemplated 
in subsection (1), or such longer time as the Commission, on application by the company, may 
allow that, the company must appoint a business rescue practitioner who satisfies the 
requirements of section 138, and who has consented in writing to accept the appointment’ [my 
emphasis]. 
                                                          
100 Climax Concrete Products supra note 98 para 17. 
101 Ibid para 18. 
102 Climax Concrete Products supra note 98 para 19.   
103 Climax Concrete Products supra note 98 para 
104 C Climax Concrete Products supra note 98 para 34. 
105 Madodza (Pty) Ltd (in business rescue) v Absa Bank Limited & others unreported case no 38906/2012 (15 
August 2012). 
106 The company was placed under business rescue on 22 November 2011 but the practitioner was appointed on 
20 January 2012. 
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The applicant now makes an application in terms of section 133107 to cease the removal 
of the vehicles in question until business rescue is complete.108 The respondents argued that 
the return of the vehicles fell outside of the moratorium109 whilst the applicant argues that the 
removal of the vehicles would make business rescue impossible for the company business since 
it needed the vehicles to operate its business, and the granting of the respondents’ application 
would be contrary and inconsistent with the purpose of business rescue and the resolution.110 
The court held that aspects of business rescue cannot be enforced when there is non-
compliance, and in this scenario, with particular reference to the failure to appoint a business 
rescue practitioner timeously to commence the rescue process,111 since this would be the 
unfortunate conduct that stands to oppose the rescue process in its entirety, and thus the relief 
sought by the applicant could not be granted.112 
From the case law mentioned above, it can be observed that the courts employ a flexible 
approach that gives proper enforcement to the right of opposing a resolution when an 
application for the latter is made by an affected person. It is also clear that the courts have made 
an attempt to strike a balance, in light of the paramount constitutional values; between the 
interests of affected persons and those of the company,113 and this balance is appropriate 
because it does not cause the remedy of business rescue to skew severely in favour of one party. 
It is my submission that there are implicit lessons and cautionary steps that can be 
learned by the company and affected persons in the exercise of section 130. First, it is clear 
that an opposition must be communicated to all affected persons by notice and in writing, so 
that the other affected persons can decide to join in on the application or to abide by the 
resolution, thereby placing emphasis on collective co-operation by the affected persons who 
hold a common interest on the company. The failure to give such notice, as shown in Golden 
Dividend v Absa supra, hinders the affected party opposing the resolution from properly 
exercising the relief before a court of law. 
Secondly, in Climax Concrete Products v Evening Flame Trading supra, it is quite clear 
that the courts intend to give effect to legitimate rights, without wavering from the 
considerations required for an application for business rescue. Similarly, the court does not 
                                                          
107 This section relates to the moratorium, to be discussed in isolation in a subsequent chapter. 
108 Madodza supra note 105 para 1. 
109 Madodza supra note 105 para 7. 
110 Madodza supra note 105 para 11.  
111 Madodza supra note 105 para 17. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Stoop op cit note 82 at 336. 
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consider the remedy of business rescue to trump the rights and interests of creditors where there 
are no compelling reasons to resuscitate an ailing company. It has been suggested that directors 
of a company must be cautious in making an application for business rescue simply out of 
panic, when in reality, the company is not financially distressed.114 Lastly, the facts in Madodza 
v Absa supra point out the classic example of non-compliance that allows affected persons, 
particularly creditors, to oppose a resolution adopted in terms of section 129 successfully.115 
(c) Section 131: Application by affected persons 
A further question thus arises: what if the company fails to take cognisance of the ailing status 
of its business, consequently passing an opportunity to adopt a resolution to save the business? 
Will the company continue to trade aimlessly116 until it reaches a state of insolvency? The 
forward-thinking and progressive legislature can be applauded in this regard because it has 
averted this dilemma through the obtaining of a court order for placing a company under 
business rescue by an affected person. 
It is clear from Chapter 6 that the rights of affected persons supplement the limited 
rights of the company itself, that is, where a company is curtailed in exercising a legally 
recognised opportunity or has no juristic justification for some conduct, section 131 provides 
such opportunities through affected persons. For example, section 131 enables an affected 
person to apply for business rescue whilst the company has been placed in liquidation,117 
thereby suspending the liquidation proceedings for the duration of the rescue process.118 
It is my submission that the logic and rationale behind this right is to prevent advancing 
conflicting notions by the company, thereby undermining the rights of affected persons and 
interested persons,119 furthermore, directors no longer have control over the business once 
they’ve placed the company under liquidation.120 This blockade, however, does not apply to 
                                                          
114 Jakomien van Staden ‘Cutting the lifeline: the termination of business rescue proceedings’ (2013) 12 De Rebus 
at 14. 
115 Yaniv Kleitman ‘Evolving business rescue’ (2014) 7 Without Prejudice at 29; Blair Wassman ‘Business 
rescue: getting it right’ (2014) 2 De Rebus at 37; Alex Elliott & Kylene Weyers ‘Hot off the business rescue 
press’ (2015) 7 Without Prejudice at 10.  
116 This is from an objective angle since the company has failed to see or foresee a financial crisis that can be 
overturned. 
117 Cassim op cit note 80 at 790. This provision is contemplated in section 131 (6) (b) and finds further support 
in Stoop op cit note 82 at 330; and Mackay-Davidson & Crystal op cit note 31 at 19. 
118 Richter v Absa 2015 ZASCA 100 para 15; Stoop op cit note 82 at 330. 
119 For example, a company that makes an application to be wound-up cannot thereafter make an application for 
business rescue in a ‘last-ditch’ attempt for the company to remain trading, simply because this would be a 
blatant abuse and disregard of the court process. 
120 MacKay-Davidson & Crystal op cit note 31 at 19.  
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affected persons, and this is the intention of the legislature to create an equilibrium for the 
remedies accessible to corporate entities and the rights of affected persons.121 
Affected persons, thus, have the right to make an application for business rescue even 
if liquidation proceedings have already begun—this is because the secondary meaning of 
‘reasonable prospects’ requires that an applicant for business rescue must show that ‘…results 
in a better return for the company’s creditors or shareholders than would result from an 
immediate liquidation of the company’.122 It is my submission that this provision creates the 
analogy that business rescue should be granted where creditors will be able to receive almost 
the total sum of their claim through the trade of the business, instead of the portions that will 
be received through the realization of the company’s assets.123 
It is, thus, my submission, that the alternative object is much easier to be demonstrated 
by affected persons seeking a company to be placed under business rescue to be a ‘reasonable 
prospect of recovery’. There is no additional obligation on affected persons to show the 
successful trade of the company after business rescue has been complete because the objective 
of the application would have already been achieved by then.124 The alternative object, 
however, has received an alarmingly low focus, despite its vast positive and possible results,125 
even in case law126 it has been side-lined, even to the extent of being recognised as an under-
utilised and self-standing remedy.127 The position remains to create better opportunities to seek 
specific performance from a business through business rescue, and although the obligation will 
be discharged after a delayed period, the return in full will still be more impressive than the 
compromised settlement through liquidation. 
 
 
 
                                                          
121 Dominique Wesso ‘Business Rescue: the position of secured creditors’ 2014 (9) De Rebus at 35; Oakdene 
supra note 53 para 28. 
122 Act 71 of 2008 op cit note 23. 
123 Oakdene supra note 53 para 23; and Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 358. 
124 This aim would have been to pay off creditors’ debts, Bradstreet suggests at 378, that this will be the case for 
all creditors since they are expected to act as a collective. Additional duties relating to the company do not befall 
on the affected persons who made the application initially. 
125 Povey & Kent ‘Rescuing dead horses’ (2017) 8 Without Prejudice at 6 The alternative object is discussed as a 
foreign concept to such an extent that it has become a shock factor for it to be a primary reason for business rescue.  
126 Petzetakis supra note 56. 
127 Ibid para 11. 
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III. THE COURT’S DISCRETION AND INTERPRETATION OF APPLICATIONS 
In this concluding section, the court’s discretion on applications for business rescue will be 
briefly analysed since the landmark judgments of Southern Palace Investments v Midnight 
Storm Investments and Oakdene Square Properties v Farm Bothasfontein, that is, where 
something less is required and the alternate object is to the benefit of the creditors respectively. 
(a) Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd128 
On 20 May 2011, a creditor (Zoneska) applied to wind up the respondent since it was unable 
to pay its debt of R 561 656.45 in terms of a loan agreement. On 27 July 2011, the applicant 
made an application to rescue the respondent in terms of section 131 of the 2008 Companies 
Act.129 The applicant contended that the respondent will negotiate new agreements with 
stakeholders to pay off debts as well as enter into further agreements with investors regarding 
buying more shares.130 
Zoneska raised the points that the respondent is indebted to investment companies, has 
no source of income and is not actually carrying out any work, thus showing that there are no 
reasonable prospects of success if the respondent were to be placed under business rescue.131 
The applicant further argued that the respondent has been able to raise R 120 million thus far 
to pay off its debts.132 
Eloff J stated that the point of business rescue is to give a financially distressed 
company a ‘breathing space’ to implement and carry out the rescue plan in the control of the 
business rescue practitioner.133 In explaining the meaning of ‘reasonable prospects’, a 
comparison was made between judicial management and business rescue, and it was found that 
‘something less is required’ for the latter.134 In assessing the facts of the case, it was held that 
there were no reasonable prospects of recovery because there was no concrete rescue plan to 
be implemented and the previous plans that had been used had all failed,135 and thus the 
application was dismissed. 
                                                          
128 Southern Palace supra note 34. 
129 Ibid para 4. 
130 Southern Palace supra note 34 para 15. 
131 Southern Palace supra note 34 para 16. 
132 Southern Palace supra note 34 para 17. 
133 Southern Palace supra note 34 para 2. 
134 Southern Palace supra note 34 para 21.  
135 Southern Palace supra note 34 para 23. 
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(b) Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd & others v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd 
& others136 
In this judgment, the appeal against a dismissed business rescue application came before the 
SCA for the first time since the remedy came into existence. Brand JA set out the two goals of 
business rescue, that is, for the financially distressed company to continue trading as a going 
concern after business rescue has come to an end, and to yield a better return for affected 
persons than liquidation if the primary goal is impossible to achieve.137 For the operation of the 
alternate goal, it was held that ‘it must be clear that the company can never be saved from 
immediate liquidation, and a better return is the only hope for the company’.138 
For the requirement of ‘reasonable prospects of recovery’, the court held that mere 
speculation will not suffice and a concrete plan must be in existence by the time the application 
has been made,139 and based on the facts of this case, the court held the plan that the appellant 
had did not indicate whether it was going to succeed or fail, and such a plan has held to 
inadequate.140 The appeal was dismissed as the court held that liquidation of the appellant 
would be more appropriate than business rescue.141 
(c) Employees Solar Spectrum Trading 83 (Pty) Ltd v Afgri Operations Ltd and Solar Spectrum 
Trading 83 (Pty) Ltd (Solar Spectrum)142 
In this unreported judgment, an application was made in terms of section 131, that is, the 
employees of the company in question had become creditors when the company failed to 
remunerate them for services rendered in accordance with their employment contracts. In 
assessing whether there were any reasonable prospects of recovery, the court noted that 
whether the burden of proof is onerous or not in an application brought by affected persons 
would depend on the position that the affected person held in the company.143  
This is relevant because it advances forth whatever information that is within the 
knowledge and possession of the affected person to be what the affected person thinks and/or 
believes to have caused the company to be in a financially distressed position and in need of 
                                                          
136 Oakdene supra note 53.  
137 Ibid para 23. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Oakdene supra note 136 para 29. 
140 Oakdene supra note 53 para 31. 
141 Oakdene supra note 53 paras 35 & 40. 
142 Employees Solar Spectrum Trading 83 (Pty) Ltd v Afgri Operations Ltd and Solar Spectrum Trading 83 (Pty) 
Ltd unreported case no 6418/2011, 18624/2011 and 66226/2011. 
143 Ibid para 17. 
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rescue mechanisms. The court observed such information and held that the employees had 
discharged the onus in showing that there were reasonable prospects of recovery, and the 
application was granted.144 
(d)  Koen & another v Wedgewood Village Golf & Country Estates & others145 
In this unnecessarily complex case, the applicants launched an application to place the 
respondent under business rescue in terms of section 131 (6) ,146 when the application came 
before Binns-Ward J, it had been postponed so that it could be transferred from being heard in 
the Eastern Cape High Court to the Western Cape High Court, thereby suspending the 
liquidation proceedings. The court accepted that the respondent was financially distressed, and 
all that remained for determination was whether there were any reasonable prospects of 
recovery.147 
The applicant contended that the respondent succeeded in procuring an unnamed 
investor to inject the crucial financial contribution to alleviate the financial distress of the 
company, and allowing the company to be liquidated would prejudice the investment.148 The 
court commented on various aspects of the application, first, the court attacked the 
postponement applications, explicitly stating that the latter application was an obvious factor 
that the application was vexatious, truly intended to suspend liquidation proceedings because 
the High Court in Eastern Cape was competent to hear the application.149 
Secondly, the court held that the requirement of ‘reasonable prospects of recovery’ must 
not only be appealing to be in existence in paper, thus being highly speculative, but must show 
concrete and cogent evidence that there are reasonable prospects.150 Lastly, in establishing the 
abovementioned requirement, the court relied in the ‘checklist requirements’ formulated in 
Southern Palace, and came to the conclusion that, since the company had ceased to trade in 
2009 and the winding-up proceedings commenced in December 2010, the reasonable prospects 
of recovery seemed bleak at best.151 
                                                          
144 Solar Spectrum supra note 142 para 34. 
145 Solar Spectrum supra note 142 note 57. 
146 This section contemplates a business rescue application even when liquidation proceedings have begun. 
147 Koen supra note 57 para 5. 
148 Koen supra note 57 para 6. 
149 Koen supra note 57 para 8.   
150 Koen supra note 57 para 17. 
151 Koen supra note 149.  
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Furthermore, the unnamed investor who had no relationship with the company was clearly a 
vague response to avoid the liquidation of the company, because the investor’s contribution 
was heavily reliant on the ceasing of liquidation proceedings, and not on the company being 
able to bounce back and continue trading.152 The court found that the furnishing of such proof 
was ‘vague and speculative’,153 and as a result, there were no reasonable prospects of recovery. 
The application was thus dismissed. 
(e) AG Petzetakis International Holdings v Petzetakis Africa (Petzetakis)154 
The respondent had a debt of R225 million to discharge, but because the company had stopped 
trading in 2010, stopped paying its employees in 2011, the company was consequently facing 
liquidation. The applicant applied for business rescue of the respondent company in terms of 
section 131; whilst the trade union representative for the unpaid employees advanced that the 
alternative object would be more appropriate in the present circumstance155. The court held that 
the application of the alternative object in South Africa depends on the primary interpretation 
of the Act156that is, giving preference to applications that would be granted if the company 
were to operate as a going concern.  
The court found that there were no reasonable prospects of recovery shown by any of 
the parties for the main or alternative object,157 thereby dismissing the application and granting 
an order for provisional liquidation.158 
(f) Nedbank Limited v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd; Essa & another v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd & others 
(Bestvest)159 
A loan agreement had been entered into between the parties in 2010, but the respondent 
subsequently ceased trading and failed to pay off the loan as contemplated, which prompted 
the application for liquidating the respondent company in 2011.160 An application for business 
rescue was made in terms of section 131, and in the evaluation of the application, the court 
discussed the remedy of business rescue and why it was needed in the corporate industry.161 
                                                          
152 Koen supra note 57 para 9. 
153Koen supra note 57 para 20. 
154 Petzetakis supra note 56. 
155 Petzetakis supra note 56 para 11. 
156Petzetakis supra note 56 para 12. 
157 Petzetakis supra note 56 para 19. 
158 Petzetakis supra note 56 para 34. 
159 Bestvest supra note 50. 
160 Ibid para 7. 
161 Bestvest supra note 50 para 18. This necessity was clearly and comprehensively linked to section 7 (k). 
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Reference was made to the checklist requirements formulated in Southern Palace and was used 
to establish whether the respondent had discharged the onus of reasonable prospects of 
recovery,162 where Gamble J dismissed the application for business rescue because, in his view, 
the onus had not been discharged.163 
(g)  Richter v Absa Bank Limited (Richter)164 
In this SCA decision, the issue before the court was whether an affected person (the appellant) 
is competent to make an application for business rescue in terms of section 131 (6) after 
liquidation has been granted against a company.165 The findings of the court a quo were in the 
negative, and the respondent accepted the finding by contending that that there were no 
reasonable prospects of recovery that can be shown where a liquidation order has already been 
granted.166 
The court explained how liquidation proceedings operate,167 and cautioned that the 
proper practice of such proceedings need not be considered final because section 136 (4) 
foreshadowed the conversion of a liquidation proceedings to a business rescue application.168 
The reasoning behind this provision, in my view, is because business rescue was intended to 
be a ‘flexible and effective process of extending the lifespan of a company and its business’.169 
Thereafter, the court accepted that although an application conversion is a remote 
possibility, it must be given full effect where there is a radical financial improvement to the 
extent that it would be beneficial for the company if it were to continue to trade as a going-
concern.170 The SCA found this to be a compelling reason and allowed the liquidation 
proceedings to be converted into business rescue proceedings.171 
The unreported judgment of Employees Solar Spectrum Trading v Afgri Operations Ltd 
and Solar Spectrum Trading was one of the earliest cases to shed light that the remedy of 
business rescue was and should be less cumbersome than judicial management when assessed 
practically, and this was the case because the applicants were able to show reasonable prospects 
                                                          
162 Bestvest supra note 50 para 48.  
163 Bestvest supra note 50 para 53. 
164 Richter supra note 118. 
165 Ibid para 4. 
166 Ibid para 7. 
167 Ibid para 10. 
168 Ibid para 13.  
169 Ibid. 
170 Richter supra note 118 para 15. 
171 Richter supra note 118 para 17. 
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of recovery. Furthermore, the applicants (who were affected persons), managed to show these 
reasonable prospects with the limited information at their disposal. It is my submission that the 
findings of the case illustrate that the remedy of business rescue is not disproportionately 
skewed in favour of the company for successful results. 
The judgment of Binns-Ward J in Koen v Wedgwood Village Golf & Country Estate 
was one of the earliest interpretations of Chapter 6 by the courts after Southern Palace, thus, 
there was a reliance on the latter case for guidance. The findings of the court were founded on 
the much-criticised ‘checklist requirements’—thereby threatening the effectiveness of the 
judgment. It is my submission that this judgment should not be easily cast aside because the 
findings of the court would have led to the same conclusion if the checklist requirements were 
left out altogether from the analysis of reasonable prospects of recovery. 
Additionally, the judgment in AG Petzetakis International Holding v Petzetakis Africa 
is problematic in that it rejects business rescue for the purposes of operating the business as a 
going concern and where it would yield a better return for creditors in comparison to 
liquidation. This myopic view undermines the purpose of Chapter 6 gravely because it fails to 
give a company an opportunity to salvage its business—instead the court sunk the business by 
granting a liquidation order. However, Eloff J in Southern Palace Investments v Midnight 
Storm Investments signalled the importance of the alternative object to be supported by cogent 
evidence through the ‘source, nature and extent of the resources that are likely to be available 
to the company’.172 Additionally the SCA has rejected the findings of AG Petzetakis 
International Holding v Petzetakis Africa regarding the alternative object by succinctly stating 
that the business rescue remedy contemplated the achievement of both the primary and 
alternative goals.173 
Lastly, the SCA in Richter presented an opportunity for the classic example of the 
‘different but equal’ interests of affected persons whereby one affected person sought 
liquidation of the company whilst another wanted to place the company under business rescue. 
The findings of the court showed that other aspects of the business rescue remedy contemplated 
in the Act should not be ignored or undermined since the rights of creditors ought to be enforced 
without contradictory notions. Special reference must be made, in my view, to section 136 (4) 
                                                          
172 Southern Palace supra note 34 para 25. 
173 Oakdene supra note 53 para 26; Section 128 (1) (h); Section 128 (1) (b) (iii); Kleitman op cit note 115 at 28. 
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because it still pursues the primary objects of business rescue, thereby facilitating Chapter 6 to 
operate in seamless fashion. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
I.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF BUSINESS RESCUE 
In business rescue, the granting or refusal of an application has far-reaching consequences for 
a company, and where a court has refused an application, the court usually grants the 
application made for liquidation of the company,174 or places the company under provisional 
liquidation mero motu.175 Where the court grants an application, section 132 makes provision 
for the time of commencement of rescue proceedings—thereby transferring the business of the 
company to a business rescue practitioner to administrate and facilitate a rescue plan for a 
successful recovery of the company. 
In this chapter, the discussion is strictly restricted to the consequences of business 
rescue where the application has been granted by the courts. To begin with, the discussion will 
relate to the operation and general impact of the moratorium, secondly, the different 
interpretations of the moratorium in international jurisdictions will be observed for the 
assessment of whether they can offer any guidance on the approach to be adopted or integrated 
into South African law. Lastly, a study on the lacuna in the remedy leading to an abuse of the 
court process of the general remedy of through case law. 
II. THE MORATORIUM 
To properly facilitate business rescue and give full effect to section 7 (k)176 of the 2008 
Companies Act, Chapter 6 makes provision for a stay or delay in legal proceedings against a 
company placed under business rescue through the moratorium. Section 133 (1) provides that,  
‘[d]uring business rescue proceedings, no legal proceeding, including enforcement 
action, against a company, or in relation to any property belonging to the company, or 
lawfully in its possession, may be commenced or proceeded with in any forum…’ 
The effect of the moratorium, primarily, is to circumvent any legal proceedings 
launched by any member of the company or a third party, such as a creditor, against the 
company whilst the business is placed under rescue. It has been suggested that a moratorium 
                                                          
174 Newcity Group supra note 76; Petzetakis supra note 56; Gormley supra note 59; and Lidino supra note 37. 
175 Koen supra note 57; Madodza supra note 105; Bestvest supra note 50. 
176 The aim and purport of the new Companies Act, promulgated under the Constitution, is to ‘provide for the 
efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies, in a manner that balances the rights and interests 
of all relevant stakeholders’. 
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not only provides the company with a breathing space to enforce the rescue plan adopted by all 
the relevant parties,177 but the breathing space is also extended to the appointed business rescue 
practitioner, so that he or she is able to facilitate and administrate the rescue process to the best 
of his or her ability, without the additional pressure of defending and simultaneously launching 
litigation against and in favour of the company.178 It is my submission that the moratorium is 
part and parcel with implementing the primary goal of the rescue process, regardless of whether 
the end goal is for the company to continue as a going-concern or to yield a better return for 
creditors. 
The moratorium is also extended to enforcement actions, that is, a creditor seeking relief 
through the courts against the company for a legally recognised right, such as a contractual 
obligation, a compromise, cession, damages etc. This means that a creditor is halted from 
seeking performance or relief from the company through the courts or appointed tribunals for 
the duration of the rescue process. Likewise, a company is also blocked by the moratorium 
from enforcing an obligation due to company from a third party through litigation. 
Contractual obligations are also impacted by the existence and operation of the 
moratorium, that is, the business rescue practitioner has been empowered to act independently 
and with the best interests of the company in mind, and this function occasionally includes 
pausing the enforceability of a contract.179 It has been argued that this power may be to the 
detriment of certain creditors because the rescue practitioner, in carrying out his or her duties, 
may unilaterally terminate contracts that are considered to be unnecessary for the business or 
inconsistent with the rescue plan adopted.180 It is my submission that, although this power is 
not as sympathetic to creditors, the purpose of Chapter 6 of the 2008 Companies Act has been 
to provide a platform for distressed companies to have an opportunity to resurrect its business 
when circumstances appear gloomy, and because of the dismal failure of judicial management, 
Chapter 6 was necessitated to be company-oriented rather than creditor-oriented. It is 
noteworthy that this right does not extend to employment agreements, and thus, some creditors 
and personnel of the company remain protected from the rescue practitioner’s power.181 
                                                          
177 Ane` Potgeiter ‘The business rescue moratorium’ (2016) 3 Without Prejudice at 20. 
178 Jonathan Swanepoel & Chandni Gopal ‘An inappropriate business rescue mess’ (2013) 7 Without Prejudice at 
17. 
179 For example, if the company had intended to extend its building or make improvements to the building, such 
as renovations, and had enlisted the services of an independent contractor to carry out this task, such a contract 
can be put on hold by the business rescue practitioner in preference to carrying out the rescue plan adopted. 
180 Khan op cit note 85 at 21. 
181 Ibid. 
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The provision also enumerates exceptional circumstances where proceedings against a 
company may be brought regardless of the moratorium, such as, ‘with written consent of the 
practitioner’,182 with ‘leave of the court’,183 and ‘criminal proceedings against the company or 
any of its directors or officers’.184 
It has been held that the moratorium is the cornerstone of business rescue,185 however, 
it has remained controversial with regards to the timing for the moratorium take effect.186 It is 
now a settled matter in our law that the moratorium begins to operate once business rescue 
proceedings have commenced187 or liquidation proceedings have been converted to business 
rescue proceedings.188 Judging by the rapid increase in case law,189 the now looming question 
relates to, at which point are business rescue proceedings deemed to have ‘commenced’? 
The courts have been uniform and consistent in providing guidance to the 
abovementioned issue, the court in Investec Bank Ltd v Bruyns (Bruyns)190 held that business 
rescue proceedings commence when an application is made to court,191 and subsequent cases 
have drawn the same conclusion.192 It is noteworthy that this consistency is drawn from the 
provisions of the moratorium itself, to wit, section 132 (1) provides that ‘business rescue 
proceedings begin when the company files a resolution to place itself under supervision…’;193 
an affected person applies to court for an order placing the company under supervision…;194 a 
                                                          
182 Section 133 (1) (a) of Act 71 of 2008; Booysen v Jonkheer Boerewynmakery (Pty) Ltd & another (2017) 1 All 
SA 862 (WCC). 
183 Section 133 (1) (b)  of Act 71 of 2008; Booysen v Jonkheer Boerewynmakery (Pty) Ltd & another (2017) 1 All 
SA 862 (WCC); Merchant West Working Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Advanced Technologies & Engineering 
Company (Pty) Ltd & another (Merchant) [2013] ZAGPJHC 109 ; and Redpath Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd v 
Marsden NO & others [2013] ZAGPJHC 148 
184 Section 133 (1) (d) of Act 71 of 2008; Cassim op cit note 80 at 792. It has been suggested in Merchant supra 
note 183 para 53, that the listed exceptions are not exhaustive since the remedy is novel to South Africa. 
185Cloete Murray & another  v Firstrand Bank Ltd t/a Wesbank [2015] ZASCA 39; Merchant supra note 183 para 
62 
186 Swanepoel & Gopal op cit note 168 at 16. 
187 Firstrand Bank Ltd v Imperial Crown Trading 143 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (4) SA 266 (KZD); Povey & Kent op cit 
note 125 at 7. 
188 Section 131 (6) of Act 71 of 2008; Van Staden v Angel Ozone Products CC (In liquidation) (2013) 4 SA 630 
(GNP). 
189 African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd & others (Kariba) 
(2013) 6 SA 471 (GNP) ; Merchant[2013] ZAGPJHC 109  supra note 183; Bruyns 2012 (5) SA 430 (WCC) ; and 
Firstrand Bank Ltd v Imperial Crown Trading 143 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (4) SA 266 (KZD).  
190 Bruyns supra note 189.  
191 Ibid para 12. 
192 Bruyns supra note 189.   
193 Section 132 (1) (a) (i) of Act 71 of 2008. 
194 Section 132 (1) (b) of Act 71 of 2008. 
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court makes an order placing a company under supervision during the course of liquidation 
proceedings…’.195 
The automatic effect of the moratorium also includes legal proceedings that are already 
taking place by the time the application for business rescue is made,196 in particular, liquidation 
proceedings to wind-up the struggling company.197 This is often problematic for creditors 
because they become barred from enforcing their rights against the company but this has been 
countered by the fact that the moratorium does not take away the creditor’s right against the 
company but simply temporarily suspends the enforcement of such right until the rescue is 
complete.198 
It has been advanced that caution must be taken to avoid giving the moratorium such 
an excessive amount of powers that have the potential of having unintentionally far-reaching 
consequences when it becomes operative. Dominique Wesso states that ‘…in terms of the 
deprivation of rights, the legislature [by creating the rescue remedy] does not intend to change 
the existing law more than necessary’.199 Furthermore, Wesso warns against incorporating 
restrictive and prejudicial obligations that the legislature did not anticipate,200 thereby further 
drawing the attention to the pre-existing reality that the legislature is still competent and in 
possession of law-making powers to expressly create provisions for such obligations. 
Once the moratorium has become operative, what remains for consideration are the 
duties and obligations imposed on the company to carry out whilst placed under business rescue 
to ‘ensure the continued existence of the company as a solvent entity’.201 This is paramount for 
South African jurisprudence in the provision of clear guidelines, which will be indicative of 
the deviation from and complete discarding of judicial management. Like most global concepts 
which reflect the societal changes of a territory or region, South Africa has entered the race of 
rescue remedies for corporate entities late, and thus lags behinds the countries that have 
implemented this particular global concept. 
The legislature allows South Africa to catch up on the race by taking or considering the 
values and norms of the nations ahead of the race through section 39 of the Constitution.  The 
                                                          
195 Section 132 (1) (c) of Act 71 of 2008. 
196 Cassim op cit note 80 at 792; Stoop op cit note 82 at 329; Bestvest supra note 50; Newcity Group  supra note 
76; Petzetakis supra note 56; Gormley supra note 59; Lidino supra note 37;and Koen supra note 57. 
197 Newcity Group supra note 76; Petzetakis supra note 56; Gormley supra note 59; and Lidino supra note 37. 
198 Povey & Kent op cit note 125, at 9; Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 371.   
199 Wesso op cit note 121 at 35. 
200 Wesso op cit note 121 at 36. 
201 Pretorious & Rossyln-Smith op cit note 21 at 109.  
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provision empowers the courts to consider international law202 and foreign law203 where there 
is no domestic law equivalent. In the upcoming section, a concise comparison will be made on 
different international jurisdictions on how the moratorium is meant to cause the business 
rescue plan to be successful, or at least create a platform where the future of the struggling 
company becomes clear.204 
III. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTIONS ON THE MORATORIUM 
As stated earlier, corporate entities contribute significantly to any region’s economy,205 and 
thus, it has become a necessity for a country or nation to facilitate the continued existence of 
companies.206 In the United States, the business rescue remedy is intended to ‘restructure the 
business of the company for successful operation in the future by creating jobs, discharging 
obligations to creditors and produce a return for the owner’.207 The moratorium is available to 
a company under business rescue for three months—this means that the failure to rescue the 
business within that time-frame enables the creditors to make an application to have the 
company liquidated.208 
When the rescue application is made, as part of the rescue plan, the court must consider 
a feasible plan intended to be in the best interests of the creditors that is ‘fair, equitable and 
complete in good faith’.209 The idea of a rescue plan that is in the best interests of the creditors, 
is to ensure that a realistic and objective plan is adopted.210 A successful rescue plan in the 
United States must lead to the restructuring of the company, and not to liquidation.211 
The moratorium in the United Kingdom places more emphasis on the appointment of 
an administrator to run the business once the company is placed under business rescue.212 
                                                          
202 Section 39 (1) (b) of the Constitution. 
203 Section 39 (1) (c) of the Constitution. 
204 Pretorious & Rosslyn-Smith op cit note 21 at 109.  
205 Ibid. 
206 Pretorious & Rosslyn-Smith op cit note 204; Joubert op cit note 4 at 550. 
207 Pretorious & Rosslyn-Smith op cit note 21 at 113; Loubser op cit note 8, at 153; see also 
https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/policy/policy_papers/corporate_insolvency/103593%20R3%20A%20U
K%20Chapter%2011%20D8.pdf, (accessed on 24 October 2018). 
208 Ibid. 
209 Pretorious & Rosslyn-Smith op cit note 21 at 115;  ‘Business Rescue: UK v US, dispelling the myths of a ‘UK 
chapter 11’ available at  
https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/policy/policy_papers/corporate_insolvency/103593%20R3%20A%20U
K%20Chapter%2011%20D8.pdf (accessed on 24 October 2018) 
210 Ibid. 
211‘Business Rescue: UK v US, dispelling the myths of a ‘UK chapter 11’ available at 
https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/policy/policy_papers/corporate_insolvency/103593%20R3%20A%20U
K%20Chapter%2011%20D8.pdf  
212 Pretorious & Rosslyn-Smith op cit note 21 at 118. 
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Additionally, the company is expected to have additional funding so that the business rescue 
plan is properly executed because the rescue remedy is considered to be expensive to carry 
out,213 with the additional expectation for creditors to have an active involvement in the 
business rescue to benefit.214 The moratorium will become operative to essentially give the 
company a breathing space to create a ‘positive environment for the company to sort out its 
difficulties’ within a one year time frame.215 
In Australia, the moratorium is expected to last between 28 to 35 days, and within that 
time stipulation, all relevant parties are given 21 days to reach consensus on executing the 
rescue plan that has been accepted.216 If no plan is accepted or the stipulated time lapses, the 
company will face liquidation,217 it is thus clear that, the remedy is designed to be creditor-
oriented, and unlike U.S law, the judicial involvement is limited to its barest minimum,218 and 
this approach is accredited with the rise in the number of companies that seek rescue.219 
It can be easily deduced from the differing international jurisdictions that a moratorium 
plays a vital role in returning a company to solvency. It is my submission that the purport and 
objective under the U.S law is legitimate but the operation of the moratorium leaves much to 
be desired because the courts are expected to come up with a rescue plan that is in the best 
interests of the creditor, and such power gravely exceeds the judicial oversight required in 
consideration of a business rescue application because the court must now adjudicate on the 
application and take on the role of the business rescue practitioner. South Africa has taken cues 
of opposite effect by allowing court oversight of the application to relate to the actual 
application itself,220 a business rescue practitioner is an external person appointed in terms of 
section 138, who is expected to carry out his duties as an officer of the court. 
Conversely, in U.K law, there are unrealistic and questionable expectations in that a 
company seeking business rescue must have ‘additional funding’ to execute the rescue plan, 
                                                          
213‘Business Rescue: UK v US, dispelling the myths of a ‘UK chapter 11’ available at 
https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/policy/policy_papers/corporate_insolvency/103593%20R3%20A%20U
K%20Chapter%2011%20D8.pdf; ‘Business rescue in the UK’ available at 
 http://www.opusllp.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/DOC-161101-NRH-research-report-pdf1.pdf  (accessed 
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214 Pretorious & Rosslyn-Smith op cit note 21 at 118; Khan op cit note 85 at 23; and Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 
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218 Pretorious & Rosslyn-Smith op cit note 21 at 120; Oakdene supra note para 24. 
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this raises questions of whether such a company is truly financially distressed. It is worth 
mentioning that the remedy anticipates that creditors participate in the rescue process to protect 
their interests. The moratorium on Australian soil is formulated in such a way that the rescue 
must be brought to completion swiftly—from adopting the resolution to implementation and 
execution. South Africa does not require a company to have any money to execute the rescue 
plan, but makes provision for post-commencement finances to take priority in the discharging 
of obligations to creditors,221 and like Australia, encourages the affected parties to participate 
in the rescue process.222 
Even in post-constitutional settings, South African law remains to be a hybrid system 
in seeking guidance from foreign law, as stated above. South African moratoriums for rescue 
applications are thus influenced by the abovementioned international jurisdictions, even where 
our law deviates slightly from the approach of the international jurisdiction so that the principle 
adopted is accommodative of the circumstances in South Africa.223 For example, section 132 
(3) posits that ‘…a company’s business rescue proceedings have not ended within three months 
after the start of those proceedings, or such a longer time as the court...may allow...’ [my 
emphasis], shows that influence is from the U.S system, but because the South African 
economy and corporate arena differs significantly to the States’, the addition that the courts 
have discretion to determine for how long a business should be placed under business rescue 
makes the remedy uniquely South African. 
IV. APPLICATIONS MADE IN ABUSE OF THE COURT PROCESS 
There has been a repeated reference to Australian law in a myriad of South African cases224 
that have made a significant impact on the remedy itself, the reality is, however, even with 
guidance from international jurisdictions, a remedy such as business rescue is not exempt from 
abuse,225 by attempting to keep the juristic entity in existence whilst it is very obvious that the 
company is neither financially distressed nor are there any reasonable prospects of recovery. 
This section will assess applications for business rescue before the court as a blatant abuse of 
the court process. 
                                                          
221Section 135 of the Act 71 of 2008. 
222Sections 142, 145, 151 of Act 71 of 2008. 
223 Povey & Kent op cit note 125; Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 366. 
224 Petzetakis supra note 56; Bestvest supra note 50; Southern Palace supra note 34; and Oakdene supra note 53. 
225 Elliott & Weyers op cit note 115 at 10. 
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(a)  Koen & another v Wedgewood Village Golf & Country Estates & others226 
In this case, as previously discussed, the financially distressed company was facing liquidation 
proceedings which were automatically suspended when an application was made for business 
rescue, and in the meantime, a further application was made to transfer the rescue proceedings 
from one High Court to another. When the applicant had to argue the case for reasonable 
prospects of recovery, the primary contention was that an unnamed investor was willing to 
inject money into the company if the liquidation proceedings are abandoned.227 
Binns-Ward J remarked that the application for business rescue was not legitimate 
because, if the company had reasonable prospects of recovery, the Eastern Cape High Court 
would have been competent to hear the application, and essentially, the transfer of proceedings 
was a delay tactic to further suspend the liquidation proceedings.228 Furthermore, it was held 
that the investment of an unnamed person subject to the abandonment of the liquidation 
proceedings was not only an attempt to ‘twist the court’s arm’ into granting the rescue 
application but also an unnecessary restriction on the rights of other creditors.229  
(b) Investec Bank Ltd v Bruyns230 
The plaintiff wanted to obtain summary judgment against the defendant for a debt of 
approximately R 11 million,231 and the defence raised by the defendant was that the company 
was placed under business rescue in terms of section 131, thereby meaning that the moratorium 
barred the plaintiff from instituting legal proceedings against the company.232 The contentious 
issue before the court was whether business rescue had commenced since the rescue application 
had not been adjudicated on,233 and Rogers AJ held that business rescue commenced when the 
application for business rescue was made.234 
Based on this finding, the moratorium became applicable, thus meaning that the 
application for summary judgment was barred, but because the rescue application had not been 
                                                          
226Koen supra note 57. 
227 Ibid para 9. 
228 Koen supra note 57 para 8. 
229 Koen supra note 57 paras 9, 10, 17 & 27. 
230 Bruyns supra note 189. 
231 Ibid para 1. 
232 Bruyns supra note para 11. 
233 Bruyns supra note para 12. 
234 Ibid. This is in accordance with section 132 (1) (b). 
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heard at that point, and that there was no evidence that the rescue application was likely to be 
granted,235 the moratorium could not be used as a defence against summary judgment.236 
(c)  Kalahari Resources (Pty) Ltd v Arcelormittal S.A & others (Kalahari)237 
The respondent, who holds 50 per cent of the shares in a company (‘Kgalagadi Manganese 
(Pty) Ltd’), made an application for business rescue, to which the applicant, who holds 40 per 
cent of the shares of the same company, has made a counter-application to oppose the rescue 
application in terms of section 130.238 The respondent argued that the company was financially 
distressed and would perform much better trading under the guidance and facilitation of a 
business rescue practitioner,239 whilst the applicant advanced that business rescue was 
inappropriate because the financially distressed status of the company was mainly caused by 
the respondent, who deliberately withheld its obligations in terms of the shareholder’s 
agreement that had been agreed upon when the company was formed.240 
After the assessment of evidence, the court accepted the applicant’s contentions that the 
respondent was the cause of the company’s financial difficulties by deliberately avoiding to 
discharge its obligations to the company,241 thereby making the company and its creditors 
vulnerable.242 Consequently, the court found this non-performance and seeking relief from the 
court to be an abuse of the court process, and proceeded to strike off the counter-application 
off the roll243 so that it could adjudicate on the unfortunate business rescue application. 
(d)  Gormley v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd & another; Anglo Irish Corporation 
Ltd v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd & another (Gormley)244 
Anglo Irish Corporation made an application to place West City Precinct Properties under 
liquidation because the respondent had a due and enforceable debt of R 219 million towards 
the applicant as a result of a loan agreement between the parties, and the respondent had no 
flow of cash because it ceded any source of income to the applicant.245 Gormley then made an 
application to place the respondent under business rescue, arguing that the respondent would 
                                                          
235 Bruyns supra note 189 para 21. 
236 Bruyns supra note 189 para 19. 
237 Kalahari Resources (Pty) Ltd v Arcelormittal S.A & others 2012 (3) All SA 555 (GSJ). 
238 Ibid para 3. 
239 Kalahari supra note237 para 69. 
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242 Ibid. 
243 Kalahari supra note 237 para 74. 
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be solvent if the moratorium would be enforced against the first applicant (Anglo Irish 
Corporation) only for a period of three to five years so that the respondent would be able to 
pay off its debt to the first applicant, the respondent’s largest creditor.246 
The court held that the respondent was not financially distressed—it was insolvent, and 
this nullified the application.247 Furthermore, the court held that even if the company was 
financially distressed, the second applicant (Gormley) did not have a business plan in mind that 
would change the respondent’s financial status for the better,248 the rescue application was 
made solely for the benefit of the moratorium that would inhibit the first applicant from 
instituting liquidation proceedings for an unreasonably long time.249 Regarding the five-year 
moratorium, the court held that Chapter 6 envisages a short-term approach to business rescue 
so that the rights of creditors are not unnecessarily restricted.250 
The court also cautioned against such an application that was exercised in futility251 
since no creditor would consent to such a long moratorium, and if such an application were to 
be granted just for the moratorium, it would communicate to companies that business rescue is 
open to abuse to frustrate the rights of creditors and avoid liquidation.252 The application was 
essentially dismissed and the company was placed under provisional liquidation. 
(e)  Absa Bank Ltd v Newcity Group (Proprietary) Ltd; Cohen v Newcity Group (Proprietary) 
Ltd & another (Newcity)253 
On 20 January 2010, the first applicant (Absa) and the respondent entered into a loan agreement 
of R30 million so that the respondent could build, own and run a hotel,254 but the loan was not 
repaid and on 29 November 2011, the first applicant made an application to liquidate the 
respondent.255 On 6 February 2012, the second applicant (Cohen) applied for the business 
rescue of the respondent, causing liquidation proceedings to be delayed until 12 June 2012.256 
On 11 June 2012, the second applicant withdrew the rescue application, conceding all the 
                                                          
246 Gormley supra note 59 para 4. 
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256 Ibid para 10. 
 41 
 
material facts relating to the respondent’s failure to repay the loan257 and that the rescue 
application was a delay mechanism so that the respondent could procure funds to repay the 
loan.258 The provisional liquidation order was granted, and the return date was scheduled for 
31 July 2012.259 
On 30 July 2012, the second applicant launched another rescue application for the 
respondent with the condition that the application would be withdrawn if the court discharges 
the provisional liquidation, the first applicant objected to the rescue application, arguing that it 
was an abuse of the court process.260 On assessing the rescue application, the court held that 
the application was not genuine because the second applicant admitted that the first application 
was a delay tactic, the second application is conditional and the timing of launching and 
withdrawing the rescue applications was questionable.261 The court eventually found that there 
was no merit to the rescue application, and thus refused it.262 
The respondent had, however, made attempts to repay the loan, and by the second 
rescue application was heard, 30 per cent of the loan had been repaid.263 The court took the 
view that, despite the abusive rescue application coupled with ulterior motives, the second 
applicant genuinely wanted to save the business of the respondent, and instead of granting a 
final liquidation order, the court discharged the provisional liquidation order on condition that 
the respondent would repay the loan, and upon default, the first applicant can approach the 
court for a liquidation order.264 
(f)  Lidino Trading 580 CC v Cross Point Trading (Pty) Ltd, In re: Mabe v Cross Point Trading 
215 (Pty) Ltd (Lidino)265 
The applicant was a contracting company that worked with the respondent when the latter had 
procured tenders. On 25 May 2012, the applicant applied to have the respondent liquidated,266 
and on 25 July 2012, the day before the liquidation hearing, the director of the respondent 
applied for the business rescue of the respondent.267 One of the director’s contentions was that 
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the applicant sought to liquidate the respondent because the former owed the latter some 
payment for work done—which was promptly denied by the applicant.268 The court held that 
the respondent had no employees and had not procured any tenders in recent times,269 and thus 
there was no cogent evidence that the respondent could be rescued.270 The court also revealed 
to the respondent that the rescue application was not the appropriate remedy that would allow 
the company to enforce the debt that the applicant allegedly owes the respond, and suggested 
the remedy of oppressive or prejudicial conduct in terms of section 163 of the 2008 Companies 
Act would be more appropriate.271 
It is my submission that the courts are vigilant in their discretion, making sure to ‘sift 
the good from the bad’ applications for business rescue,272 thus avoiding to ‘rubber stamp’ 
applications without considering the merits of each application.273 The courts are strict in 
ensuring that frivolous applications will not pass even the first hurdle,274 and this is easily 
supported by the abovementioned case law, where it has been enunciated that the courts will 
not entertain applications that are intended to take advantage of the rescue process, and so the 
courts strive to grant applications that contemplate the remedy laid down in the four corners of 
Chapter 6 of the Companies Act. It has been suggested that parties seeking business rescue 
should be cautious in implying restrictions that the legislature did not intend.275 
  The courts in Lidino and Newcity Group have not shied away from adjudicating with 
more appropriate remedies for applications that stem from an abuse of the court process. The 
concept of the moratorium has many advantages for a company that is seeking business rescue, 
such as providing a breathing space to implement the rescue plan that is intended and trusted 
to rapidly change the trajectory of a company’s business. The disadvantage with the flexibility 
contemplated in section 132 (3) is that there is essentially no time frame set out for the operation 
of the moratorium, meaning that it has the possibility of operating indefinitely,276 thereby 
contradicting the speedy and expedient approach contemplated by the legislature. The 
                                                          
268 Lidino supra note 265 para 13. 
269Ibid para 21. 
270 Lidino supra note 265 para 23. 
271 Lidino supra note 268.  
272 Kleitman op cit note 115 at 28. 
273 Ibid. 
274 Wassman op cit note 115 at 38. 
275 Wesso op cit note 121 at 35. 
276 Wassman op cit note 115 at 37. 
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moratorium, being company-oriented, contains no remedy for affected persons,277 it merely 
suspends their rights. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
I.  THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WINDING-UP AND BUSINESS RESCUE 
In the previous chapters, it arose, on more than one occasion, that unsuccessful applications for 
business rescue have the unavoidable consequence of placing the company under liquidation. 
The notion of liquidation is not novel to our law; it is typically the concluding step of 
terminating the existence of a juristic entity.278 Unlike business rescue, the rules governing the 
termination of a company have managed to be exclusively exist in the four corners of the 1973 
Companies Act.279 
In this final chapter, a comparative analysis of business rescue and winding-up of a 
company will be made to respond to the ancient question of whether the remedies can 
practically co-exist, taking into account that South African law has been drafted and 
promulgated in such a manner that both remedies have been accommodated. 
II.  WINDING-UP 
Chapter 2 of the 2008 Companies gives effect to section 7 (f) in that the Act purports to 
‘promote the development of companies within all sectors of the economy, and encourage 
active participation in economic organisation, management and productivity’ [my emphasis]. 
Part G makes provisions for the winding-up of a solvent company for any reason and those 
enumerated in section 82. A company that manages to reach an ‘insolvent’ status is unable to 
take advantage of section 7 (f), but rather, must reconcile itself to the inevitable task of being 
wound-up.  
The general understanding in the law of the phrase ‘insolvent’ makes reference to a 
situation where a person’s (natural or juristic) liabilities exceed the assets, and to such an extent 
that the insolvent person is backed into a corner of alienating and realizing these assets in order 
                                                          
277 Ibid. 
278 The counterpart or equivalent procedure for natural persons is the declaration of the estate of a person to be 
‘insolvent’—and thus proceeding to wind-up the insolvent estate. Section 339 of the 1973 Companies Act dictates 
that the rules of insolvency will apply mutatis mutandis in the winding-up of a company where the Act itself does 
not make any applicable and specific provisions. 
279 Although the 1973 Companies Act has been repealed by the 2008 Companies Act, provisions relating to the 
winding-up of the company as well as reckless and fraudulent trading, have not been repealed but continue, as an 
exception, to operate and co-exist with the current Act. 
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to discharge and reduce the obligations. To find oneself in such a predicament is far from 
favourable in any spectrum—it clearly fulfils the idea that liquidation and winding up of a 
juristic person is a drastic and irrevocable measure.280 
It is trite in South African law that liquidation proceedings leading up to the winding-
up of the company are creditor-oriented281 in that preference is given to the rights of creditors 
over the ‘active participation’ of a company in the ‘economic organisation, management and 
productivity’ that would ensure the continued subsistence of the company282 and as a 
contributing member of society283 in the strengthening and stimulation of the South African 
economy.  
Section 344 of the 1973 Companies Act lists the circumstances where the courts are 
competent to grant an order winding-up a company, such as ‘the company has by special 
resolution resolved that it be wound up by the court’;284 ‘the company has not commenced its 
business within a year from its incorporation, or has suspended its business for a whole year’;285 
75 per cent of the issued share capital of the company has been lost or has become useless for 
the business of the company,286 and the company is unable to pay its debts.287 
Section 345 formally begins the winding-up of a company theoretically by categorising 
circumstance whereby a company would be considered to be ‘insolvent’. Section 345 states 
that,  
‘[a] company…shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debts if a creditor, by cession or 
otherwise, to whom the company is indebted in a sum not less than one hundred rand then due- 
has served on the company, by leaving the same at its registered office, a demand requiring the 
company to pay the sum so due;288 or any process issued on a judgment, decree or order of any 
court in favour of a creditor of the company is returned by the sheriff or the messenger with an 
endorsement that he has not found sufficient disposable property to satisfy the judgment, decree 
or order or that any disposable property found did not upon sale satisfy such process’.289 
                                                          
280 Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 352. 
281 Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 356; and Richard Bradstreet ‘Business rescue proves to be credit-friendly: CJ 
Claassen’s analysis of business rescue procedures in Oakdene Square Properties’ (2013) 130 SALJ at 46. 
282 Cassim op cit note 80 at 782; Joubert op cit note 4 at 550. 
283 Ibid; Pretorious & Rossyln-Smith op cit note 21 at 109. 
284 Section 344 (a) of Act 71 of 2008. 
285 Section 344 (c) of Act 71 of 2008. 
286 Section 344 (e )of Act 71 of 2008. 
287 Section 344 (f ) of Act 71 of 2008. 
288 Section 345 (1) (a) (ii) of Act 71 of 2008. 
289 Section 345 (1) (b) of Act 71 of 2008. 
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Once it is obvious that a company neatly fits into the ‘insolvent’ category, the company 
may adopt a resolution to wind-up the company,290 and afterwards give notice to its creditors 
so that they may come forward with their claims.291 Alternatively, the creditors can act as a 
unit and make the application to court to have the company wound-up.292 
Once a company is wound-up, section 358 makes provision for a moratorium to take 
effect from the date that winding-up proceedings are considered to have commenced. The 
moratorium is not a fringe benefit only attached to business rescue293 but a ‘tried and tested’ 
system intended to facilitate rescue and dissolution proceedings without additional 
difficulties.294 The moratorium in liquidation proceedings is purported to circumvent 
unwarranted and unproven claims from creditors295 against a company seeking to conclude its 
existence in the corporate sphere. 
Additionally, the 1973 Companies Act requires that there must be a transfer of the 
company in its entirety from its directors and officers to the liquidator, who has been chosen 
and appointed by the directors or creditors, depending on which party brought the liquidation 
application; and must be accepted to be competent by the Master of the High Court,296 for the 
facilitation and administration of the company. The liquidator is appointed to realize assets in 
favour of claims that have been proved in a hierarchal manner,297 with preference being given 
to secured creditors and creditors with concurrent claims whilst unsecured creditors are 
considered last on the liquidator’s list. 
Lastly, once the claims of creditors have been discharged298 and all assets of the 
company have been realized, section 419 of the 1973 Companies Act proceeds to capture and 
relay the consequences of a company that has been wound-up. Once a company has been 
wound-up; it no longer holds a juristic personality and can no longer trade in its previous area 
of expertise or interest, therefore, such a company is considered to have been dissolved and no 
longer carries any legal status to benefit itself or anyone else. 
 
                                                          
290 Section 343 (1) (b) and (2) of Act 71 of 2008. 
291 Section 364 (1) (a) (ii) of Act 71 of 2008. . 
292 Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 352-83. 
293 Povey & Kent op cit note 125 at 6; Khan op cit note 85 at 21.  
294 Povey & Kent op cit note 12, at 7; Khan ibid; Bradstreet op cit note 281 at 46; Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 364. 
295 Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 352. 
296 Sections 367 and 369 of Act 71 of 2008. 
297 Sections 366 and 409 of Act 71 of 2008. 
298 Or as best as could be discharged, depending on the proceeds from the sale of assets. 
 46 
 
III. BUSINESS RESCUE 
The remedy of business rescue, however, was created to give effect to section 7 (k), which 
highlights the objectives of the remedy as ‘to provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of 
financially distressed companies, in a manner that balances the rights and interests of all the 
relevant stakeholders’. As previously stated, South African corporate law, since the inception 
of statutory regulation,299 has not failed in providing a remedy for companies placed in 
constraints because of the downward spiral of its finances.300 What has failed dismally, is the 
practical application of the remedy of judicial management, which, for an unreasonably long 
time, remained to be a theoretical right for companies. 
The promulgation of Chapter 6 of the 2008 Companies Act seeks to create a remedy 
that is practicable and genuinely accessible for companies,301 by placing a less burdensome 
onus on the applicant to show that a company is financially distressed and there are reasonable 
prospects of recovery.302 It is my submission that the business rescue remedy is a bridge for 
companies that wish to continue trading and participate in the economic arena, but for the 
financial constraints, it is unable to do so and inevitably faces liquidation. The remedy also 
seeks to point out that ‘financially distressed’ does not equate to ‘insolvent’, the trigger for 
business rescue is that a company must be ‘financially distressed’,303 and the earlier a company 
is found to fall within the former category,304 the easier it will be to recover the company’s 
business as a going concern instead of letting the company ‘plummet into extinction’.305 
Like liquidation proceedings, an application can be made for business rescue by the 
adoption of a resolution by the company306 or an affected person makes an application to 
court.307 A successful application will result in an automatic moratorium for legal proceedings 
against the company for as long as the company is placed under business rescue,308 and when 
the moratorium is in place, the business affairs of the company must be handed over to the 
                                                          
299 Starting with the Companies Act 46 of 1926. 
300 Loubser op cit note 8 at 153. 
301 Southern Palace supra note 34; Bestvest supra note 50; Richter supra note 118; Koen supra note 57; and Joubert 
op cit note 4 at 550. 
302 Ibid. 
303 Mackay-Davidson & Crystal op cit note 31 at 19. 
304 Cassim op cit note 80 at 782; Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 364; Bradstreet op cit note 281 at 47; Madodza supra 
note 105; Lidino supra note 37; Gormley supra note 59; and Newcity Group supra note 76.  
305 Newcity Group (Proprietary) supra note 253 para 20. 
306 Section 129 of the 2008 Companies Act. 
307 Section 131 of the 2008 Companies Act. 
308 Section 133 of Act 71 of 2008. 
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external person appointed as the business rescue practitioner309 to formulate and adopt a rescue 
plan that is meant to place the company towards a path of solvency.310 
The effect of a successful rescue application is that the financially distressed company 
will continue to trade in accordance with the rescue plan in place so that the business is more 
valuable as a going-concern,311 alternatively, the company will continue to trade in accordance 
with the rescue plan in place so that the company yields a better return for creditors than 
liquidation.312 In the case of an unsuccessful application, whether the company was not 
financially distressed or there are no reasonable prospects of recovery, such a company is 
labelled as insolvent and faces liquidation. 
IV.  CAN BUSINESS RESCUE AND LIQUIDATION CO-EXIST? 
The concept of business rescue as a ‘go-between’ remedy between solvency and insolvency 
creates the unavoidable probing of whether the remedy is a mere delay for liquidation 
proceedings that inevitably takes place in most instances. The remedies are on opposite ends 
of the spectrum, business rescue is for ailing companies that need a breathing space313 so that 
the company can take positive steps to restore the company to its former glory and be capable 
of trading as a going-concern after business rescue has ended.314 Liquidation, on the other hand, 
is the procedure designed to dissolve a company and terminate its existence in the corporate 
industry, and it is appropriate where the company has been declared insolvent.315 
It is my submission, however, that the remedy of business rescue from the legislature 
caters specifically to companies that fall in the middle—not insolvent but the financial 
difficulties are so rife that the company is struggling to trade as a solvent entity. Previously, 
financially distressed companies were coerced into liquidation due to the practical 
unavailability of a remedy fashioned specifically for their plight. Chapter 6 of the 2008 
                                                          
309 Section 138 of Act 71 of 2008; Booysen supra note 182; and Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 355. 
310 Section 150 of Act 71 of 2008; Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 353 & 355; Gormley supra note 59; and Newcity 
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313 From legal proceedings, discharging obligations and performances in terms of agreements or transactions 
concluded with a third party. 
314 Cassim op cit note 80 at 782; Pretorious & Rossyln-Smith op cit note 21 at 113; Joubert op cit note 4 at 550 & 
554; Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 353; Newcity Group compared to Gormley case. 
315 Section 345 of Act 61 of 1973. 
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Companies Act seeks to redress this plight by placing business rescue in the middle of the 
spectrum that balances solvency and insolvency on opposite ends.316 
Academic writers have advanced that the remedy of business rescue should be allowed 
to overtake and have preference over liquidation of a company where the facts show that it 
would be in the best interests of the company to be saved because, even in its financially 
distressed state, it is still appealing to be financially and economically viable to continue 
trading.317 The 2008 Companies Act, holistically supports business rescue over liquidation,318 
a dynamic perspective that cements and confirms the remedy to be company-oriented, and this 
view is supported by case law where it would be reasonable for business rescue to be used 
instead of liquidation.319  
The consequence of both business rescue and liquidation is the automatic operation of 
the moratorium, the difference, however, presents itself in the steps taken once the moratorium 
is in place. Section 138 of the 2008 Companies Act provides for the appointment of a business 
rescue practitioner, whose duties include formulating a business rescue plan to be adopted by 
the directors of the company and the affected persons,320 and to implement the adopted rescue 
plan to the benefit of the company321 and affected persons.322 Essentially, the management and 
facilitation of the business is handed over to the business rescue practitioner who acts with the 
participation of the directors and affected persons.323 
Section 367 of the 1973 Companies Act, however, regulates the appointment of the 
liquidator who will facilitate the dissolution of the company, and as part of his duties, the 
liquidator must create a platform for all potential creditors to prove their claims against the 
company—an unproven claim is abandoned and will not be discharged by the company.324 The 
liquidator must dispose of all the company assets in a manner that will result in all the 
 creditors’ claims being settled in a manner that is just and equitable.325 The remedy of 
                                                          
316 Stoop op cit note 82 at 335. 
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321 The case of Gormley elaborately illustrates this point. 
322 The cases of Booysen and Newcity Group show the interests of affected persons. 
323 Khan op cit note 85 at 23; Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 362; Pretorious & Rossyln-Smith op cit note 21 at 118; 
and Swanepoel & Gopal op cit note 168 at 16. 
324 Section 366 of Act 61of 1973. 
325 Bradstreet op cit note 11 at 369. 
 49 
 
liquidation relates to finality, thus the claims of creditors can be reduced and altered in 
accordance with the proceeds from the sale of assets, and the liquidator is tasked with the 
tedious and taxing endeavour of reaching a compromise with the creditors so that they can 
exercise their rights.326 
The status of a company placed under business rescue is that it remains a viable and 
trading entity for the purposes of ensuring that it will be trading as a going-concern after the 
rescue period has come to an end, if the rescue plan is unsuccessful, the company is then 
liquidated.327 The status of a company after it is wound-up, however, is the total dissolution 
and elimination of the company as a juristic entity, the company is further unable to trade when 
it is under liquidation. It is thus clear, that liquidation has drastic and far-reaching consequences 
for a company in comparison to business rescue, which alleviates the financial constraints on 
the company by allowing the company to trade whilst the moratorium is in place—and 
liquidation becomes a possibility only when the rescue plan has been unsuccessful. 
It has been suggested that the insolvency system in South Africa is creditor-oriented, 
thereby reducing the prospects of a corporate rescue,328 it is my submission, however, in that 
this argument holds very little merit because the purpose of business rescue is to assist 
financially distressed companies whilst insolvency is designed to protect and enforce the rights 
of creditors. Furthermore, the Constitution and the 2008 Companies Act have been drafted in 
such a way that the rights of the company do not disregard the rights of creditors, thus there is 
a balance in the rights held by these relevant parties. It is a fundamental and inevitable 
consequence that if business rescue is company-oriented, then an insolvency system must be 
creditor-oriented. The manner in which the latter remedy is structured, in any event, does not 
reduce the applicability of the former remedy, and as important as business rescue is as a 
remedy, winding-up and liquidation proceedings are still necessitated to exist in company 
law.329  
It is my submission, therefore, that the remedies of business rescue and liquidation 
serve different and important functions in the corporate industry. Liquidation is a viable and 
necessary remedy for a company that is insolvent whilst business rescue comes to the aid of 
companies with complex financial circumstances. The remedies are neither contradictory nor 
                                                          
326 Sections 383, 386, 387, 390, 397 and 398 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
327 Koen supra note 57; Madodza supra note 105; and Bestvest supra note 50. 
328 Loubser op cit note 8 at 157. 
329 Ibid at 159. 
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mutually destructive, and thus, despite their controversies, can peacefully co-exist in South 
African law currently and for the future. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the short span of seven years since its inception, business rescue made remarkable and 
advantageous changes that judicial management would not have been able to do. Progress from 
business rescue cannot fully erase the decades of failure created and perpetuated as a result of 
judicial management, and in addition, business rescue is a self-standing remedy for ailing 
companies primarily, thus meaning that the remedy places emphasis on rescuing ailing 
companies and providing a framework for that company to reach a state of solvency.  
Chapter 6 of the 2008 Companies Act introduced a lower threshold for the applicant to 
show that a company is financially distressed and there are reasonable prospects of recovery. 
Furthermore, the remedy remains creditor-friendly by creating rights for affected persons, so 
that they are not side-lined whilst the remedy is in pursuit of the company’s interests, provided 
that the affected persons act as a collective so that they may benefit from the remedy when it 
has been enforced. 
In the wake of business rescue, numerous rescue applications mushroomed overnight, 
and attention shifted to the courts on how the courts would exercise their discretion. The courts 
have been intolerant of applications launched just for the benefits of the rescue remedy, such 
as the moratorium or suspend liquidation proceedings, and over the years, the number of 
abusive applications have dwindled significantly because of the precedent created by the 
courts. 
Lastly, the controversy between liquidation and business rescue remains overcast on 
the new remedy, with the latter favoured more where, whilst the former remains a drastic 
remedy, applicable over business rescue in circumstances where it would be more appropriate 
to grant liquidation, and thus, the remedy has shown to be reserved for companies that have 
truly run out of their luck. Surprisingly, the remedies have continued to co-exist without 
crossing paths that would cause one remedy to be preferred over the other, and this is positive 
feedback because it shows that there is both an important and fundamental place for both 
remedies in company law. 
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In conclusion, it is my submission that the business rescue remedy has and continues to 
come to the rescue of financially distressed companies, through the drawing of a line in the 
sand on the future of the company. And like any other remedy, business rescue is not without 
hiccups here and there in its journey, but one thing is certain, business rescue has and will 
continue to impress on South African jurisprudence. The concluding remarks of this 
dissertation is that business rescue, as a remedy, has succeeded in creating an accessible 
platform for companies to remain economically viable, and this is in line with international 
jurisdictions on the importance of companies in company law.  
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